An Approach to the Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols

An Approach to the Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols (1996)

by Dominique Bolignano

Venue:	In Third ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Citations:	43 - 2 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	An Approach to the Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols	user correction - Legacy Corrections
AUTHOR NAME	Dominique Bolignano	SVM HeaderParse 0.1
AUTHOR AFFIL	; 1	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	; Bull, 78340 Les Clayes-sous-Bois, France	SVM HeaderParse 0.1
ABSTRACT	We present an approach to the verification of authentication protocols. The approach is based on the use of general purpose formal methods. It is complementary with modal logic based-approaches as it allows for a description of protocol, hypotheses and authentication properties at a finer level of precision and with more freedom. It differs from formal methods based approaches and in particular from Meadows' approach in that it focuses more on proof conciseness and readability than on proof automatization. To achieve this we use a clear separation between the modeling of reliable agents and that of unreliable agents or more generally of intruders. We also show how to express authentication properties using basic and precise temporal notions. The approach is presented by the mean of an example based on a public-key version of the Needham-Schroeder protocol.	user correction - Legacy Corrections
YEAR	1996	INFERENCE
VENUE	In Third ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security	INFERENCE
VENUE TYPE	CONFERENCE	INFERENCE
PAGES	106--118	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	26 found	ParsCit 1.0