Using Secure Coprocessors

Using Secure Coprocessors (1994)

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by Bennet Yee

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	Using Secure Coprocessors	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR NAME	Bennet Yee	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR AFFIL	School of Computer Science; Carnegie Mellon University	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
AUTHOR ADDR	Pittsburgh, PA 15213	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
ABSTRACT	The views and conclusions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or endorsements of any of the research sponsors. How do we build distributed systems that are secure? Cryptographic techniques can be used to secure the communications between physically separated systems, but this is not enough: we must be able to guarantee the privacy of the cryptographic keys and the integrity of the cryptographic functions, in addition to the integrity of the security kernel and access control databases we have on the machines. Physical security is a central assumption upon which secure distributed systems are built; without this foundation even the best cryptosystem or the most secure kernel will crumble. In this thesis, I address the distributed security problem by proposing the addition of a small, physically secure hardware module, a secure coprocessor, to standard workstations and PCs. My central axiom is that secure coprocessors are able to maintain the privacy of the data they process. This thesis attacks the distributed security problem from multiple sides. First, I analyze the security properties of existing system components, both at the hardware and	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
YEAR	1994	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
VENUE TYPE	TECHREPORT	INFERENCE
TECH	Ph.D. thesis	INFERENCE
CITATIONS	99 found	ParsCit 1.0