SNAPP: Stateless Network-Authenticated Path Pinning

SNAPP: Stateless Network-Authenticated Path Pinning (2008)

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by Bryan Parno , Adrian Perrig , Dave Andersen

Venue:	PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (ASIACCS)
Citations:	1 - 0 self

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Datum	Value	Source
TITLE	SNAPP: Stateless Network-Authenticated Path Pinning	user correction
AUTHOR NAME	Bryan Parno	user correction
AUTHOR AFFIL	Carnegie Mellon University	user correction
AUTHOR NAME	Adrian Perrig	user correction
AUTHOR NAME	Dave Andersen	user correction
ABSTRACT	This paper examines a new building block for next-generation networks: SNAPP, or Stateless Network-Authenticated Path Pinning. SNAPP-enabled routers securely embed their routing decisions in the packet headers of a stream of traffic, effectively pinning a flow’s path between sender and receiver. A sender can use the pinned path (even if routes subsequently change) by including the path embedding in later packet headers. This architectural building block decouples routing from forwarding, which greatly enhances the availability of a path in the face of routing misconfigurations or malicious attacks. To demonstrate the extreme flexibility of SNAPP, we show how it can support a wide range of applications, including sender-controlled paths, expensive route lookups, sender anonymity, and sender accountability. Our analysis shows that SNAPP’s overhead is low, and the system is easily implemented in hardware. We believe that SNAPP is a worthy addition to the network architect’s toolbox, enabling a variety of new designs and trade-offs.	SVM HeaderParse 0.2
YEAR	2008	user correction
VENUE	PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (ASIACCS)	user correction
VENUE TYPE	CONFERENCE	user correction
CITATIONS	32 found	ParsCit 1.0