Abstract

Constructive (intuitionist, anti-realist) semantics has thus far been lacking an adequate concept of truth in innity concerning factual (i.e., empirical, non-mathematical) sentences. One consequence of this problem is the difculty of incorporating inductive reasoning in constructive semantics. It is not possible to formulate a notion for probable truth in innity if there is no adequate notion of what truth in innity is. One needs a notion of a constructive possible world based on sensory expe-rience. Moreover, a constructive probability measure must be dened over these constructively possible empirical worlds. This study denes a particular kind of approach to the concept of truth in inn-ity for Rudolf Carnap's inductive logic. The new approach is based on truth in the consecutive nite domains of individuals. This concept will be given a construc-tive interpretation. What can be veriably said about an empirical statement with respect to this concept of truth, will be explained, for which purpose a constructive