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Approved by: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT (2006)
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BibTeX
@MISC{Graves06approvedby:,
author = {Gregory Howard Graves and Gregory Howard Graves and Head Of Department and Brett A. Peters},
title = {Approved by: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT},
year = {2006}
}
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Abstract
Physical security systems are intended to prevent or mitigate potentially catas-trophic loss of property or life. Decisions regarding the selection of one system or configuration of resources over another may be viewed as design decisions within a risk theoretic setting. The problem of revealing a clear preference among design alter-natives, using only a partial or inexact delineation of event probabilities, is examined. In this dissertation, an analytical framework for the assessment of the risk as-sociated with a physical security system is presented. Linear programming is used to determine bounds on the expected utility of an alternative, and conditions for the separation of preferences among alternatives are shown. If distinguishable pref-erences do not exist, techniques to determine what information may help to separate preferences are presented. The linear programming approach leads to identification of vulnerabilities in a security system through an examination of the solution to the dual problem. Security of a hypothetical military forward operating base is considered as an illustrative example. For two alternative security schemes, the uncertainty inherent in
Keyphrases
physical security system design alter-natives distinguishable pref-erences alternative security scheme illustrative example catas-trophic loss analytical framework security system linear programming approach expected utility clear preference hypothetical military forward inexact delineation event probability uncertainty inherent dual problem risk theoretic setting linear programming design decision
