Inductive proofs of computational secrecy

Inductive proofs of computational secrecy (2007)

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by Arnab Roy , Anupam Datta , Ante Derek , John C. Mitchell

Venue:	In ESORICS
Citations:	3 - 1 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Roy07inductiveproofs,
    author = {Arnab Roy and Anupam Datta and Ante Derek and John C. Mitchell},
    title = {Inductive proofs of computational secrecy},
    booktitle = {In ESORICS},
    year = {2007},
    pages = {219--234}
}

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Abstract

Abstract. Secrecy properties of network protocols assert that no probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher can win a suitable game presented by a challenger. Because such properties are not determined by traceby-trace behavior of the protocol, we establish a trace-based protocol condition, suitable for inductive proofs, that guarantees a generic reduction from protocol attacks to attacks on underlying primitives. We use this condition to present a compositional inductive proof system for secrecy, and illustrate the system by giving a modular, formal proof of computational authentication and secrecy properties of Kerberos V5. 1

Citations

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