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CEO Turnover and Takeover Threats: New Evidence From Antitakeover Legislation
BibTeX
@MISC{_ceoturnover,
author = {},
title = {CEO Turnover and Takeover Threats: New Evidence From Antitakeover Legislation},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
To understand the interaction between internal control mechanisms and the market for control, using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology, we examine CEO turnover following an exogenous decline of takeover threats second generation of antitakeover legislation in the U.S. Di¤erent from previous research using only time series variation in CEO turnover, it is shown that, compared to a control group, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance increased for rms a¤ected by the laws. The increases are both statistically and economically signi cant. We also nd that the increases in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance are concentrated in rms with stronger board monitoring. Our results suggest that internal control mechanisms and the market for control may be substitutes instead of complements. JEL Classi cation:
Keyphrases
ceo turnover new evidence antitakeover legislation takeover threat internal control mechanism antitakeover legislation time series variation takeover threat second generation di erence-in-di erence methodology previous research exogenous decline board monitoring signi cant u.s. di erent jel classi cation control group
