Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis (2006)
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| Venue: | 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2006 |
| Citations: | 8 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Backes06computationallysound,
author = {Michael Backes and Peeter Laud},
title = {Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis},
booktitle = {13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2006},
year = {2006},
pages = {370--379},
publisher = {ACM}
}
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Abstract
We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability /UC which entails that secrecy properties proven by our tool are automatically guaranteed to hold for secure cryptographic implementations of the analyzed protocol, with respect to the more fine-grained cryptographic secrecy definitions and adversary models.







