PREPRINT VERSION: submitted. manuscript No. (2003)
BibTeX
@MISC{Inserted03preprintversion:,
author = {Will Be Inserted and Martín G. Zimmermann and Víctor M. Eguíluz and Depto De Fisica–fcen and Pabellón I Ciudad Universitaria and Buenos Aires},
title = {PREPRINT VERSION: submitted. manuscript No.},
year = {2003}
}
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Abstract
Cooperative behavior among a group of agents is studied assuming adaptive interactions. Each agent plays a Prisoner's Dilemma game with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff and imitates the strategy of its best neighbor. Agents may punish or reward their neighbors by removing or sustaining the interactions, according to their satisfaction level and strategy played. Whenever an agent prefers to dismiss an interaction, the corresponding neighbor is replaced by another randomly chosen agent, introducing diversity and evolution to the agents neighborhoods. Numerical and analytical study shows the existence of a full-defective state coexisting with a highly cooperative steady state. The latter equilibrium solution is composed mostly by cooperative agents, with a minor population of defectors that exploit the cooperators. It is shown how the network adaptation dynamics favors the emergence of cooperators with highest payoff. These "leaders" are shown to sustain the global cooperative steady state. Also we find the surprising result that on average, the average payoff of defectors is larger than the average payoff of cooperators, recovering the dilemma at a macro scale. Whenever "leaders" are perturbed (e.g. by addition of noise), an unstable situation arises and global cascades with oscillations between the nearly full defection network and the fully cooperative outcome are observed.
Keyphrases
preprint version average payoff cooperative outcome cooperative behavior minor population network adaptation dynamic macro scale full defection network cooperative agent satisfaction level latter equilibrium solution agent neighborhood full-defective state coexisting unstable situation arises agent prefers aggregate payoff local neighbor cooperative steady state global cascade corresponding neighbor global cooperative steady state analytical study adaptive interaction surprising result dilemma game
