Refinement and Extension of Encrypted Key Exchange (1995)
| Venue: | ACM Operating Systems Review |
| Citations: | 51 - 3 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Steiner95refinementand,
author = {Michael Steiner and Gene Tsudik and Michael Waidner},
title = {Refinement and Extension of Encrypted Key Exchange},
journal = {ACM Operating Systems Review},
year = {1995},
volume = {29},
pages = {22--30}
}
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Abstract
In their recent paper, "Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks, " Bellovin and Merritt propose a novel and elegant method for safeguarding weak passwords. This paper discusses a possible weakness in the proposed protocol, develops some enhancements and simplifications, and provides a security analysis of the resultant minimal EKE protocol. In addition, the basic 2-party EKE model is extended to the 3-party setting; this yields a protocol with some interesting properties. Most importantly, this paper illustrates, once again, the subtlety associated with designing password-based protocols. 1 Introduction The Encrypted Key Exchange paper [1] (hereafter referred to as simply EKE) presents a novel and elegant method of protecting weak secrets from dictionary attacks. It develops several protocol variants based on different underlying cryptosystems, e.g., RSA, El-Gamal, and Diffie-Hellman. The 'generic' version of EKE is illustrated in Figure 1. ...
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