DMCA
A Theory of Political Competition over Military Policy and Income Redistribution (2008)
| Venue: | The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
| Citations: | 2 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Yoshihara08atheory,
author = {Naoki Yoshihara and Naoki Yoshihara},
title = {A Theory of Political Competition over Military Policy and Income Redistribution},
journal = {The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University},
year = {2008}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
We discuss political competition games between Left and Right parties, in which the policy space is two dimensional. One issue is the choice of proportional tax rate, and the second is the allocation of tax revenue between military policies and social welfare policies. On these political issues, the stylized fact is that left-wing parties prefer higher tax rates and lower military expenditure than do right-wing parties. We examine the kinds of political environments in which this fact can be rationalized as the equilibrium outcome of a given political game. By adopting the notion of the party-unanimity Nash equilibrium [Roe-mer (1998; 1999; 2001; 2005)], not only voters ’ economic motivations, but also their ideological positions are shown to be crucial factors in explaining stylized party behavior.
Keyphrases
military policy political competition income redistribution social welfare policy equilibrium outcome party behavior party-unanimity nash equilibrium military expenditure right-wing party political game tax rate ideological position voter economic motivation political environment right party stylized fact policy space political competition game left-wing party tax revenue political issue proportional tax rate crucial factor
