BibTeX
@MISC{Nuccetelli_chapter7,
author = {Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay},
title = {Chapter 7 Does Analytical Moral Naturalism Rest on a Mistake?},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute all versions of moral naturalism by offering an extended inference consisting of the open question argument followed by the charge that moral naturalism commits a “naturalistic fallacy. ” Although there is consensus that this extended inference fails to undermine all varieties of moral naturalism, the open question argument (OQA) is often vindicated as an argument against analytical moral naturalism. By contrast, the charge that analytical naturalism commits the naturalistic fallacy usually finds no takers at all. In this paper we argue that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by Frank Jackson (1998, 2003) and Michael Smith (2000) does after all rest on a mistake – though perhaps not the one Moore had in mind when he made the naturalistic fallacy charge. We construe analytical moral naturalism as roughly the doctrine that some moral predicates and sentences are a priori equivalent to predicates and sentences framed in non-moral terms (Jackson 2003: 558). Given analytical moral naturalism, it is at least possible that there are some such a priori or conceptual equivalences. But our version of the OQA challenges the claim that it is possible to reduce the moral to the natural in this way. And it does so by showing that the reductions envisaged by these analytical naturalists are open to doubt on a priori grounds. We further
Keyphrases
analytical moral naturalism moral naturalism analytical moral naturalism rest analytical naturalism naturalistic fallacy open question argument extended inference consisting moral predicate extended inference fails non-moral term michael smith naturalistic fallacy charge frank jackson one moore conceptual equivalence analytical naturalist priori equivalent priori ground
