Abstract

. In this paper we propose the deontic logic dus, that formalizes reasoning about prescriptive obligations in update semantics. In dus the definition of logical validity of obligations is not based on truth values but on action dynamics. You know the meaning of a normative sentence if you know the change it brings about in the ideality relation of anyone the news conveyed by the norm applies to. 1 The logic of norms One of the first topics discussed in the development of deontic logic was the question whether norms have truth values. For example, Von Wright (1981, 1998) was hesitant to call deontic formulas `logical truths,' because "it seems to be a matter of extralogical decision when we shall say that `there are' or `are not' such and such norms." Alchourr'on and Bulygin discussed the possibility of a logic of norms, which they distinguish from the logic of normative propositions. "One such issue is the problem of the possibility of a logic of norms. Some authors think that there ...

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