BibTeX
@MISC{Steel05securityprotocol,
author = {Graham Steel},
title = {Security Protocol Analysis},
year = {2005}
}
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Abstract
This note describes previously completed and ongoing research in the MRG in the area of security protocol analysis. 1 Overview Security protocols have attracted a lot of attention from formal methods researchers. This is because their design is very tricky, and very hard for a human to think precisely about. This is evidenced by the number of flaws in and attacks on these protocols that have been found. As such it is an important application area. In the MRG, we looked first at the problem of group protocols. This is an area where tools based on making small concrete abstractions of network scenarios, such as model checkers, are at a disadvantage. This is because they are forced to choose in advance parameters such as the size of the group, and what scenario will be played out, i.e. who will join and who will leave, and in what order. An inductive model captures the problem much more naturally, and allows one to search for attacks in any scenario. To search for attacks in this model, we developed CORAL, a version of the theorem prover SPASS tuned for dealing
