Constitutional Change in Federations: The Role of Complementary Institutions (2012)
BibTeX
@MISC{Bednar12constitutionalchange,
author = {Jenna Bednar and Jörg Broschek},
title = {Constitutional Change in Federations: The Role of Complementary Institutions},
year = {2012}
}
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Abstract
This essay applies new developments in complex systems theory to understand how constitutional change can occur informally, without amendment. The chapter develops a three-part theory of constitutional dynamics by analyzing the the complex interaction of the federal system’s varied building blocks: the national government, the state governments, and the auxiliary institutions of governance (such as a judiciary), and the non-governmental institutions, including the party system. First, constitutional innovation derives from constitutional ambiguity and institutional imperfection. Second, complementary institutions constrain informal constitutional change to an incremental path, preventing radical ruptures from past practice. Third, through a model of behavioral spillovers and cross-domain influences, the chapter offers a theory of the emergence of constitutional trends. These dynamics may help us to to understand how periods of centralization
Keyphrases
constitutional change complementary institution cross-domain influence institutional imperfection complex system theory varied building block auxiliary institution party system constitutional dynamic constitutional innovation derives complex interaction national government three-part theory non-governmental institution state government behavioral spillover informal constitutional change radical rupture past practice incremental path new development constitutional ambiguity federal system constitutional trend
