Coordination, Moderation and Institutional Balancing in American House Elections at Midterm (2000)
Cached
Download Links
| Citations: | 6 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Mebane00coordination,moderation,
author = {Walter R. Mebane and Jr. and Jr. Y and Jasjeet S. Sekhon},
title = {Coordination, Moderation and Institutional Balancing in American House Elections at Midterm},
year = {2000}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
Coordination, Moderation and Institutional Balancing in American House Elections at Midterm Individuals have been coordinating their turnout decisions and vote choices for the House of Representatives in recent midterm elections, with each eligible voter #each elector# using a strategy that features policy moderation. Coordination is de#ned as a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium among electors, in which each elector has both common knowledge and private information about the election outcome. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level data from NES surveys of years 1978#1998 support both coordination and a model in which electors act non-strategically. Both models generate midterm cycles in which the President's party usually loses vote share at midterm. The 1998 exception was due to Republican party positions being too conservative for most electors. Midterm electors have expected the House to dominate the President in determining post-election...
Keyphrases
institutional balancing american house election election outcome turnout decision stochastic choice model vote choice vote share private information policy moderation recent midterm election individual-level data midterm individual eligible voter republican party position ne survey midterm cycle midterm elector common knowledge noncooperative rational expectation
