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Dispositional versus epistemic causality (2006)
| Venue: | Minds and Machines |
| Citations: | 6 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Williamson06dispositionalversus,
author = {Jon Williamson},
title = {Dispositional versus epistemic causality},
booktitle = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2006},
pages = {16--259}
}
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Abstract
I put forward several desiderata that a philosophical theory of causality should satisfy: it should account for the objectivity of causality, it should underpin formalisms for causal reasoning, it should admit a viable epistemology, it should be able to cope with the great variety of causal claims that are made, and it should be ontologically parsimonious. I argue that Nancy Cartwright’s dispositional account of causality goes part way towards meeting these criteria but is lacking in important respects. I go on to argue that my epistemic account, which ties causal relationships to an agent’s knowledge and ignorance, performs well in the light of the desiderata. Such an account, I claim, is all we require from a theory of
