Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4

DMCA

Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 (2001)

Cached

Download Links

Other Repositories/Bibliography

DBLP

by Scott Fluhrer , Itsik Mantin , Adi Shamir

Venue:	PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON SELECTED AREAS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
Citations:	270 - 1 self

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Fluhrer01weaknessesin,
    author = {Scott Fluhrer and Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir},
    title = {Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4},
    booktitle = { PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON SELECTED AREAS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY},
    year = {2001},
    pages = {1--24},
    publisher = {}
}

OpenURL

Abstract

In this paper we present several weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4, and describe their cryptanalytic significance. We identify a large number of weak keys, in which knowledge of a small number of key bits suffices to determine many state and output bits with non-negligible probability. We use these weak keys to construct new distinguishers for RC4, and to mount related key attacks with practical complexities. Finally, we show that RC4 is completely insecure in a common mode of operation which is used in the widely deployed Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol (WEP, which is part of the 802.11 standard), in which a fixed secret key is concatenated with known IV modifiers in order to encrypt different messages. Our new passive ciphertext-only attack on this mode can recover an arbitrarily long key in a negligible amount of time which grows only linearly with its size, both for 24 and 128 bit IV modifiers.

Keyphrases

key scheduling algorithm weak key many state negligible amount wired equivalent privacy protocol long key large number cryptanalytic significance practical complexity output bit key bit suffices known iv modifier new distinguishers related key attack present several weakness different message common mode secret key small number bit iv modifier non-negligible probability new passive ciphertext-only attack

DMCA