2002): “Equilibrium Selection through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper

2002): “Equilibrium Selection through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper

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by Antonio Cabrales , Rosemarie Nagel , Roc Armenter , Van Damme

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BibTeX

@MISC{Cabrales_2002):“equilibrium,
    author = {Antonio Cabrales and Rosemarie Nagel and Roc Armenter and Van Damme},
    title = {2002): “Equilibrium Selection through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study,” Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper},
    year = {}
}

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Abstract

Nick Vriend and seminar audiences at UPF, Munich, Stockholm for helpful comments. Cabrales and Nagel

Citations

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