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Computing Symbolic Models for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols (2001)
| Venue: | In Proc. of the 14th Computer Security Foundation Workshop (CSFW14 |
| Citations: | 69 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Fiore01computingsymbolic,
author = {Marcelo Fiore and Martín Abadi},
title = {Computing Symbolic Models for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols},
booktitle = {In Proc. of the 14th Computer Security Foundation Workshop (CSFW14},
year = {2001},
pages = {160--173},
publisher = {IEEE, Computer Society Press}
}
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Abstract
We consider the problem of automatically verifying infinite-state cryptographic protocols. Specifically, we present an algorithm that given a finite process describing a protocol in a hostile environment (trying to force the system into a "bad" state) computes a model of traces on which security properties can be checked. Because of unbounded inputs from the environment, even finite processes have an infinite set of traces; the main focus of our approach is the reduction of this infinite set to a finite set by a symbolic analysis of the knowledge of the environment. Our algorithm is sound (and we conjecture complete) for protocols with shared-key encryption/decryption that use arbitrary messages as keys; further it is complete in the common and important case in which the cryptographic keys are messages of bounded size.
Keyphrases
verifying cryptographic protocol symbolic model infinite set finite process bounded size shared-key encryption decryption bad state symbolic analysis cryptographic key hostile environment main focus unbounded input important case infinite-state cryptographic protocol arbitrary message security property
