Investment and Liquidation in Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard
| Venue: | Journal of Monetary Economics |
| Citations: | 55 - 5 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Quadrini_investmentand,
author = {Vincenzo Quadrini and Jel G and Gian Luca Clementi},
title = {Investment and Liquidation in Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard},
journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
year = {},
pages = {751}
}
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Abstract
In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data.
