Deposit Insurance as a Private Club: The Case of Germany,” Quarterly Review of Economic and Finance, forthcoming (2001)
| Citations: | 3 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Beck01depositinsurance,
author = {Thorsten Beck and Benno Wink and Karl-heinz Hillen and German Bundesbank and Joergen Bang From and The German Bank Association and Aslı Demirgüç-kunt and Daniela Klingebiel and Luc Laeven},
title = {Deposit Insurance as a Private Club: The Case of Germany,” Quarterly Review of Economic and Finance, forthcoming},
year = {2001}
}
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Abstract
Comments welcome! Abstract: This paper describes and evaluates the deposit insurance scheme set up by private commercial banks in Germany in 1975. Unlike schemes in other countries, its funding and management is completely private, without any public supervision. While other schemes rely on monitoring by depositors to decrease moral hazard problems, the German scheme relies on peer monitoring by its member banks. This paper evaluates the German deposit insurance scheme on the background of its unique characteristics, a very concentrated private banking market, a strong institutional environment and an antibankruptcy bias in Germany.
