Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

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Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2005)

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by Vincent P. Crawford , Nagore Iriberri

Venue:	ECONOMETRICA
Citations:	80 - 3 self

BibTeX

@ARTICLE{Crawford05level-kauctions:,
    author = {Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri},
    title = {Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?},
    journal = {ECONOMETRICA},
    year = {2005},
    pages = {1721--1770}
}