Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control (2009)
| Citations: | 62 - 28 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Faliszewski09llulland,
author = {Piotr Faliszewski and Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe},
title = {Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control},
year = {2009}
}
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Abstract
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’s victory. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result and it can be determined in polynomial time on which inputs the agent can succeed is said to be vulnerable to the given type of control. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result, yet in which it is NP-hard to recognize the inputs on which the agent can succeed, is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems previously known to be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridization. This paper studies a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland α, where the parameter α is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates. In every previously studied constructive or destructive
Keyphrases
resist bribery election system addition deletion partition candidate win external agent copeland voting destructive control refers standard control type constructive control parameterized version paper study polynomial time rational number candidate victory election refers artificial election system pairwise comparison np-hard winner problem
