@MISC{Stabler_naturallogic, author = {Edward Stabler and Lsa Workshop}, title = {Natural Logic in Linguistic Theory}, year = {} }
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Abstract
From Aristotle to Quine and Evans and many others, it is a familiar idea that certain semantic relations among sentences are determined by their "grammatical form " alone. That is, independent of particular lexical contents, the "shape " of the certain expressions has semantic consequences. A simple notion of "grammatical form " provided in recent work (Keenan & Stabler) provides an elegant way to make this familiar idea precise, making it easy to demonstrate that, in human languages, some *but not all * entailments are grammatically encoded. At least, this is so if standard assumptions of formal syntax and semantics are adopted; here we will want to re-assess some of the standard assumptions on a number of grounds, and we will arrive at a distinctively linguistic and psychological perspective that is quite different in detail from Quine and Evans and others. As part of linguistic theory, this project is rich in consequences. That there is a principled, non-arbitrary association between structure, semantic value and inference is assumed in much recent linguistic theory, as in the syntacticians’