Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle (2008)
| Citations: | 9 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Bianchi08overborrowingand,
author = {Javier Bianchi and I Thank Juan Dubra and Bora Durdu and Ro Rebucci},
title = {Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle},
year = {2008}
}
OpenURL
Abstract
Credit constraints that link a private agent’s debt to market-determined prices embody a credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and constrained socially optimal equilibria, inducing private agents to “overborrow. ” The externality arises because agents fail to internalize the price effects of additional borrowing when the credit constraint binds. We quantify the effects of this inefficiency in a two-sector DSGE model of a small open economy calibrated to emerging markets. The credit externality increases the probability of financial crises by a factor of 7 and causes the maximum drop in consumption to increase by 10 percentage points.







