Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences (2009)
| Venue: | IN SUBMISSION |
| Citations: | 4 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Xia09strategy-proofvoting,
author = {Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer},
title = {Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences},
booktitle = {IN SUBMISSION},
year = {2009},
publisher = {}
}
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Abstract
In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voters ’ preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets that follow a common order over issues. We show that if the preference domain is lexicographic, then a voting rule satisfying non-imposition is strategyproof if and only if it can be decomposed into multiple strategyproof rules, one for each issue and each setting of the issues preceding it. We then prove impossibility theorems for strategy-proof voting rules that satisfy non-imposition in two kinds of preference domains: the first result is for supersets of any lexicographic preference domain, and the second is for supersets of any rich preference domain (for a notion of richness introduced by Le Breton and Sen).
