Elections Can be Manipulated Often
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by
Ehud Friedgut
,
Gil Kalai
,
Noam Nisan
| Citations: | 39 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Friedgut_electionscan,
author = {Ehud Friedgut and Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan},
title = {Elections Can be Manipulated Often },
year = {}
}
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Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
