Explicit knowledge in dolphins?
BibTeX
@MISC{A_explicitknowledge,
author = {Eduardo Mercado Iii A and Scott O. Murray B},
title = {Explicit knowledge in dolphins?},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
Abstract. The theoretical framework proposed by Dienes & Perner sets the wrong standards for knowledge to be considered explicit. Animals other than humans possess knowledge, too, some of which is probably explicit. We argue that a comparative approach to investigating knowledge is likely to be more fruitful than one based on linguistic constructs and unobservable phenomena. We agree with Dienes & Perner (D&P) that there is no simple dichotomy between implicit and explicit knowledge and that the idea of characterizing knowledge along a scale of explicitness is worth considering in detail. The ambiguities associated with the explicit/implicit distinction and the need for more precisely defined classifications have been discussed extensively by other researchers (for a review, see Engelkamp & Wippich 1995). By decomposing knowledge in terms of parameters derived from the representational theory of mind, D&P hope to resolve these ambiguities, and thereby
