Security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine

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Security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine (2006)

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by Ariel J. Feldman , J. Alex Halderman , Edward W. Felten

Venue:	In Proc. 2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT ’07
Citations:	66 - 8 self

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Feldman06securityanalysis,
    author = {Ariel J. Feldman and J. Alex Halderman and Edward W. Felten},
    title = {Security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine},
    booktitle = {In Proc. 2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT ’07},
    year = {2006}
}

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Abstract

This paper presents a fully independent security study of a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its hardware and software. We obtained the machine from a private party. Analysis of the machine, in light of real election procedures, shows that it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks. For example, an attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its removable memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious code; malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker could also create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently from machine to machine during normal election activities—a voting-machine virus. We have constructed working demonstrations of these attacks in our lab. Mitigating these threats will require changes to the voting machine’s hardware and software and the adoption of more rigorous election procedures. 1

Keyphrases

diebold accuvote-ts voting machine security analysis malicious code physical access rigorous election procedure normal election activity real election procedure fraudulent vote count removable memory card independent security study serious attack working demonstration private party voting machine hardware voting-machine virus

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