Remote Timing Attacks are Practical (2003)
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by
David Brumley
,
Dan Boneh
| Venue: | In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium |
| Citations: | 123 - 3 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Brumley03remotetiming,
author = {David Brumley and Dan Boneh},
title = {Remote Timing Attacks are Practical},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium},
year = {2003},
pages = {1--14}
}
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Abstract
Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore all security systems should defend against them.
