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A logic of authentication (1990)

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by Michael Burrows , Martín Abadi , Roger Needham
Venue:ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS
Citations:1332 - 22 self
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BibTeX

@ARTICLE{Burrows90alogic,
    author = {Michael Burrows and Martín Abadi and Roger Needham},
    title = {A logic of authentication},
    journal = {ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS},
    year = {1990},
    volume = {8},
    pages = {18--36}
}

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Abstract

Questions of belief are essential in analyzing protocols for the authentication of principals in distributed computing systems. In this paper we motivate, set out, and exemplify a logic specifically designed for this analysis; we show how various protocols differ subtly with respect to the required initial assumptions of the participants and their final beliefs. Our formalism has enabled us to isolate and express these differences with a precision that was not previously possible. It has drawn attention to features of protocols of which we and their authors were previously unaware, and allowed us to suggest improvements to the protocols. The reasoning about some protocols has been mechanically verified. This paper starts with an informal account of the problem, goes on to explain the formalism to be used, and gives examples of its application to protocols from the literature, both with shared-key cryptography and with public-key cryptography. Some of the examples are chosen because of their practical importance, while others serve to illustrate subtle points of the logic and to explain how we use it. We discuss extensions of the logic motivated by actual practice -- for example, in order to account for the use of hash functions in signatures. The final sections contain a formal semantics of the logic and some conclusions.

Keyphrases

shared-key cryptography    required initial assumption    various protocol    public-key cryptography    final belief    subtle point    informal account    practical importance    final section    actual practice    formal semantics    hash function   

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