• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart
  • DMCA
  • Donate

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations
Advanced Search Include Citations | Disambiguate

DMCA

Dynamic programming for partially observable stochastic games (2004)

Cached

  • Download as a PDF

Download Links

  • [anytime.cs.umass.edu]
  • [anytime.cs.umass.edu]
  • [anytime.cs.umass.edu]
  • [anytime.cs.umass.edu]
  • [rbr.cs.umass.edu]
  • [rbr.cs.umass.edu]
  • [www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu]
  • [spider.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu]
  • [www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu]
  • [spider.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu]
  • [www.aaai.org]
  • [www.aaai.org]
  • [www.aaai.org]
  • [www.cs.msstate.edu]
  • [rbrserver.cs.umass.edu]
  • [www.cs.umass.edu]
  • [www.cs.unh.edu]

  • Other Repositories/Bibliography

  • DBLP
  • Save to List
  • Add to Collection
  • Correct Errors
  • Monitor Changes
by Eric A. Hansen
Venue:In Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Citations:159 - 25 self
  • Summary
  • Citations
  • Active Bibliography
  • Co-citation
  • Clustered Documents
  • Version History

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Hansen04dynamicprogramming,
    author = {Eric A. Hansen},
    title = {Dynamic programming for partially observable stochastic games},
    booktitle = {In Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
    year = {2004},
    pages = {709--715}
}

Share

Facebook Twitter Reddit Bibsonomy

OpenURL

 

Abstract

We develop an exact dynamic programming algorithm for partially observable stochastic games (POSGs). The algorithm is a synthesis of dynamic programming for partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) and iterated elimination of dominated strategies in normal form games. We prove that when applied to finite-horizon POSGs, the algorithm iteratively eliminates very weakly dominated strategies without first forming a normal form representation of the game. For the special case in which agents share the same payoffs, the algorithm can be used to find an optimal solution. We present preliminary empirical results and discuss ways to further exploit POMDP theory in solving POSGs. 1.

Keyphrases

dynamic programming    observable stochastic game    observable markov decision process    normal form game    optimal solution    finite-horizon posgs    iterated elimination    present preliminary empirical result    exact dynamic programming algorithm    dominated strategy    agent share    normal form representation    exploit pomdp theory    special case    discus way   

Powered by: Apache Solr
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit and Index Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2019 The Pennsylvania State University