Abstract

Modular system architectures, such as integrated modular avionics (IMA) in the aerospace sector, offer potential benefits of improved flexibility in function allocation, reduced development costs and improved maintainability. However, they require a new certification approach. The traditional approach to certification is to prepare monolithic safety cases as bespoke developments for a specific system in a fixed configuration. However, this nullifies the benefits of flexibility and reduced rework claimed of IMA-based systems and will necessitate the development of new safety cases for all possible (current and future) configurations of the architecture. This paper discusses a modular approach to safety case construction, whereby the safety case is partitioned into separable arguments of safety corresponding with the components of the system architecture. Such an approach relies upon properties of the IMA system architecture (such as segregation and location independence) having been established. The paper describes how such properties can be assessed to show that they are met and trade-offs performed during architecture definition reusing information and techniques from the safety argument process.

Citations