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Analysis of an Electronic Voting System (2003)

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by Tadayoshi Kohno , Adam Stubblefield , Aviel D. Rubin , Dan S. Wallach
Citations:186 - 16 self
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BibTeX

@MISC{Kohno03analysisof,
    author = {Tadayoshi Kohno and Adam Stubblefield and Aviel D. Rubin and Dan S. Wallach},
    title = {Analysis of an Electronic Voting System},
    year = {2003}
}

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Abstract

Recent election problems have sparked great interest in managing the election process through the use of electronic voting systems. While computer scientists, for the most part, have been warning of the perils of such action, vendors have forged ahead with their products, claiming increased security and reliability. Many municipalities have adopted electronic systems, and the number of deployed systems is rising. For these new computerized voting systems, neither source code nor the results of any third-party certification analyses have been available for the general population to study, because vendors claim that secrecy is a necessary requirement to keep their systems secure. Recently, however, the source code purporting to be the software for a voting system from a major manufacturer appeared on the Internet. This manufacturer’s systems were used in Georgia’s state-wide elections in 2002, and the company just announced that the state of Maryland awarded them an order valued at up to $55.6 million to deliver touch screen voting systems. 1 This unique opportunity for independent scientific analysis of voting system source code demonstrates the fallacy of the closed-source argument for such a critical system. Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We highlight several issues including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography,

Keyphrases

electronic voting system    voting system    source code    unauthorized privilege escalation    third-party certification analysis    necessary requirement    election process    manufacturer system    system secure    electronic system    many municipality    new computerized voting system    recent election problem    incorrect use    system source code    several issue    independent scientific analysis    deployed system    computer scientist    great interest    major manufacturer    general population    critical system    state-wide election    minimal security standard    unique opportunity    closed-source argument   

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