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Issues in computational Vickrey auction (2000)
| Venue: | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE |
| Citations: | 65 - 28 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Sandholm00issuesin,
author = {Tuomas Sandholm},
title = {Issues in computational Vickrey auction},
journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE},
year = {2000},
volume = {4},
pages = {299--306}
}
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Abstract
The Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multiagent systems. First we review its limitations so as to guide practitioners in their decision of when to use that protocol. These limitations include lower revenue than alternative protocols, lying in non-private-value auctions, bidder collusion, a lying auctioneer, and undesirable revelation of sensitive information. We discuss the special characteristics of Internet auctions: third party auction servers, cryptography, and how proxy agents relate to the revelation principle and fail to promote truth-telling.
