A Processor Architecture Defense against Buffer Overflow Attacks

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A Processor Architecture Defense against Buffer Overflow Attacks (2003)

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by John P. McGregor , David K. Karig , Zhijie Shi , and Ruby B. Lee , Ruby B. Lee

Venue:	IEEE International Conference on Information Technology: Research and Education
Citations:	39 - 2 self

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{McGregor03aprocessor,
    author = {John P. McGregor and David K. Karig and Zhijie Shi and and Ruby B. Lee and Ruby B. Lee},
    title = {A Processor Architecture Defense against Buffer Overflow Attacks},
    booktitle = {IEEE International Conference on Information Technology: Research and Education},
    year = {2003},
    pages = {243--250}
}

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Abstract

Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the memory stack continue to pose serious threats to network and computer security. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, a malicious party can strategically overwrite the return address of a procedure call, obtain control of a system, and subsequently launch more virulent attacks. Software countermeasures for such intrusions entail modifications to applications, compilers, and operating systems. Despite the availability of these defenses, many systems remain vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks.

Keyphrases

buffer overflow attack processor architecture defense return address procedure call many system serious threat overflow attack computer security virulent attack buffer overflow vulnerability memory stack malicious party

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