Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

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Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (2006)

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by Shahar Dobzinski , Noam Nisan , Michael Schapira

Venue:	IN STOC
Citations:	105 - 17 self

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Dobzinski06truthfulrandomized,
    author = {Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira},
    title = {Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions},
    booktitle = {IN STOC},
    year = {2006},
    pages = {644--652},
    publisher = {}
}

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Abstract

We design two computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentive-compatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O(pm)-approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations -- this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log2 m)- approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentive-compatible mechanism for this class which only provides an O(pm)-approximation.

Keyphrases

combinatorial auction incentive compatibility universal sense arbitrary bidder valuation recent previous work optimal social welfare bidder valuation first mechanism submodular bidder polynomial time general bidder preference incentive-compatible mechanism computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanism

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