Denial of Service Resilience in Ad Hoc Networks

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Denial of Service Resilience in Ad Hoc Networks (2004)

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by Imad Aad , Jean-Pierre Hubaux , Edward W. Knightly

Venue:	In Proc. of ACM MobiCom
Citations:	81 - 4 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Aad04denialof,
    author = {Imad Aad and Jean-Pierre Hubaux and Edward W. Knightly},
    title = {Denial of Service Resilience in Ad Hoc Networks},
    booktitle = {In Proc. of ACM MobiCom},
    year = {2004},
    pages = {202--215}
}

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Abstract

Significant progress has been made towards making ad hoc networks secure and DoS resilient. However, little attention has been focused on quantifying DoS resilience: Do ad hoc networks have sufficiently redundant paths and counter-DoS mechanisms to make DoS attacks largely ineffective? Or are there attack and system factors that can lead to devastating effects? In this paper, we design and study DoS attacks in order to assess the damage that difficultto -detect attackers can cause. The first attack we study, called the JellyFish attack, is targeted against closed-loop flows such as TCP; although protocol compliant, it has devastating effects. The second is the Black Hole attack, which has effects similar to the JellyFish, but on open-loop flows. We quantify via simulations and analytical modeling the scalability of DoS attacks as a function of key performance parameters such as mobility, system size, node density, and counter-DoS strategy. One perhaps surprising result is that such DoS attacks can increase the capacity of ad hoc networks, as they starve multi-hop flows and only allow one-hop communication, a capacity-maximizing, yet clearly undesirable situation.

Keyphrases

ad hoc network do attack service resilience black hole attack do resilience significant progress undesirable situation counter-dos strategy surprising result open-loop flow multi-hop flow do resilient key performance parameter first attack detect attacker jellyfish attack protocol compliant system size little attention counter-dos mechanism closed-loop flow system factor node density redundant path ad hoc network secure devastating effect one-hop communication

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