Algorithmic mechanism design

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Algorithmic mechanism design (1999)

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by Noam Nisan , Amir Ronen

Venue:	Games and Economic Behavior
Citations:	662 - 23 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Nisan99algorithmicmechanism,
    author = {Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen},
    title = {Algorithmic mechanism design},
    booktitle = {Games and Economic Behavior},
    year = {1999},
    pages = {129--140}
}

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Abstract

We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents ’ interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools do not suffice. Journal of Economic Literature

Keyphrases

algorithmic mechanism design agent interest economic literature representative task scheduling problem algorithm designer standard mechanism design tool distributed setting algorithmic problem mechanism design main technical contribution

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