DMCA
They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices
Cached
Download Links
| Citations: | 42 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Gollakota_theycan,
author = {Shyamnath Gollakota and Haitham Hassanieh and Benjamin Ransford and Dina Katabi and Kevin Fu},
title = {They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices},
year = {}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
Wireless communication has become an intrinsic part of modern implantable medical devices (IMDs). Recent work, however, has demonstrated that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the confidentiality of IMDs ’ transmitted data or to send unauthorized commands to IMDs—even commands that cause the device todeliver anelectricshocktothe patient.Thekeychallenge in addressing these attacks stems from the difficulty of modifying or replacing already-implanted IMDs. Thus, in this paper, we explore the feasibility of protecting an implantable device from such attacks without modifying the device itself.We present a physicallayer solution that delegates the security of an IMD to a personal base station called the shield. The shield uses a novel radio design that can act as a jammer-cum-receiver. This design allows it tojam the IMD’s messages, preventing others from decoding them while being able to decode them itself. It also allows the shield to jam unauthorized commands—even those that try to alter the shield’s own transmissions. We implement our design in a software radio and evaluate it with commercial IMDs. We find that it effectively provides confidentialityfor private data andprotects the IMD from unauthorized commands.
Keyphrases
implantable medical device non-invasive security unauthorized command commercial imds wireless connectivity anelectricshocktothe patient imd message wireless communication intrinsic part implantable device software radio already-implanted imds novel radio design physicallayer solution modern implantable medical device personal base station confidentialityfor private data recent work
