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Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation (2004)
by
Nikolai S. Kukushkin
| Venue: | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Citations: | 20 - 7 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Kukushkin04bestresponse,
author = {Nikolai S. Kukushkin},
title = {Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {2004},
pages = {94--110}
}
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Abstract
If in a finite strategic game all strategies are scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners ’ choices, and one of three “single crossing” conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a
