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COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA in Finite Games (1996)
| Citations: | 147 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{McKelvey96computationof,
author = {Richard D. McKelvey and Andrew Mclennan},
title = {COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA in Finite Games},
year = {1996}
}
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Abstract
We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for niten-person games. Classical path following methods, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm for two person games, and Scarf-type fixed point algorithms for n-person games provide globally convergent methods for finding a sample equilibrium. For large problems, methods which are not globally convergent, such as sequential linear complementarity methods may be preferred on the grounds of speed. None of these methods are capable of characterizing the entire set of Nash equilibria. More computationally intensive methods, which derive from the theory of semi-algebraic sets are required for finding all equilibria. These methods can also be applied to compute various equilibrium refinements.
Keyphrases
finite game computation equilibrium nash equilibrium various equilibrium refinement large problem niten-person game sample equilibrium n-person game intensive method current state classical path entire set numerical computation semi-algebraic set lemke-howson algorithm convergent method point algorithm person game sequential linear complementarity method
