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A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality (2003)
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| Venue: | American psychologist |
| Citations: | 416 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Kahneman03aperspective,
author = {Daniel Kahneman},
title = {A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality},
journal = {American psychologist},
year = {2003},
pages = {697--720}
}
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Abstract
Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.
Keyphrases
intuitive judgment decision making effortless intuition prospect theory related concept early study central result intuitive thought extensional attribute attribute substitution characteristic bias accessibility help heuristic process intuitive thinking deliberate reasoning occasional correction late amos tversky
