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On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996)
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| Venue: | Psychological Review |
| Citations: | 176 - 16 self |
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@ARTICLE{Gigerenzer96onnarrow,
author = {Gerd Gigerenzer},
title = {On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky},
journal = {Psychological Review},
year = {1996},
pages = {592--596}
}
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Abstract
the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistical reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1996) incorrectly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. In contrast, Gigerenzer has proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgments are valid and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not. or how often, cognitive illusions disappear. The focus should be rather the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear. A postscript responds to Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) postscript. I welcome Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) reply to my critique (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991, 1994; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) and hope this exchange will encourage a rethinking of research strategies. I emphasize research strategies, rather than specific empirical results or even explanations of those results, because I believe that this debate is fundamentally about what
Keyphrases
vague heuristic narrow norm cognitive illusion research strategy postscript responds frequency judgment unnecessarily narrow norm statistical reasoning specific empirical result sound reasoning heuristics-and-biases approach gigerenzer murray frequency format so-called cognitive illusion detailed model even explanation cognitive process
