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Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in Dissent (2013)
| Citations: | 1 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Syta13securityanalysis,
author = {Ewa Syta and Aaron Johnson and Henry Corrigan-gibbs and Shu-chun Weng and David Wolinsky and Bryan Ford and Ewa Syta and Aaron Johnson and Henry Corrigan-gibbs and Shu-chun Weng},
title = {Security Analysis of Accountable Anonymity in Dissent},
year = {2013}
}
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Abstract
Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example in group dis-cussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users, however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Cryptographers Networks (DC-nets) leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks, mix net-works are difficult to protect against traffic analysis, and accountable voting schemes are un-suited to general anonymous messaging. DISSENT is the first general protocol offering provable anonymity and accountability for moderate-size groups, while efficiently handling unbalanced communication demands among users. We present an improved and hardened DISSENT protocol, define its precise security properties, and offer rigorous proofs of these properties. The improved protocol systematically addresses the delicate balance between provably hiding the identities of well-behaved users, while provably revealing the identities of disruptive users, a challenging task because many forms of misbehavior are inherently undetectable. The new protocol also addresses several non-trivial attacks on the original DISSENT protocol stemming from subtle design flaws. 1
Keyphrases
accountable anonymity security analysis hardened dissent protocol unbalanced communication demand improved protocol disruptive user sybil attack general anonymous messaging challenging task new protocol group dis-cussion accountable voting scheme traffic analysis precise security property moderate-size group cryptographer network delicate balance well-behaved user rigorous proof several non-trivial attack instant messaging forum original dissent protocol many form subtle design flaw
