DMCA
Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution (2003)
| Citations: | 2 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Trockel03core-equivalencefor,
author = {Walter Trockel},
title = {Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution},
year = {2003}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bar-gaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively. ∗ This article is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, a friend since 30 years.
Keyphrases
nash bargaining solution core equivalence walrasian approach competitive sequence present paper establishes counterpart nash bargaining specific class continuum counterpart production economy standard two-person bar-gaining game birgit grodal coalition production economy nash solution pure exchange economy core result
