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Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections (2006)

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by Ariel D. Procaccia , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Venue:In AAMAS
Citations:106 - 23 self
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BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Procaccia06juntadistributions,
    author = {Ariel D. Procaccia and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein},
    title = {Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections},
    booktitle = {In AAMAS},
    year = {2006}
}

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Abstract

Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used N P-hardness as the complexity measure. Such a worst-case analysis may be an insufficient guarantee of resistance to manipulation. Indeed, we demonstrate that N P-hard manipulations may be tractable in the averagecase. For this purpose, we augment the existing theory of average-case complexity with some new concepts. In particular, we consider elections distributed with respect to junta distributions, which concentrate on hard instances. We use our techniques to prove that scoring protocols are susceptible to manipulation by coalitions, when the number of candidates is constant. 1.

Keyphrases

average-case complexity    junta distribution    hard instance    computational complexity    worst-case analysis    previous study    scoring protocol    complexity measure    important issue    insufficient guarantee    strategic behavior    voting protocol    p-hard manipulation    new concept   

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