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A theory of sequential reciprocity (1998)
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| Venue: | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Citations: | 396 - 17 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Dufwenberg98atheory,
author = {Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger},
title = {A theory of sequential reciprocity},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {1998},
volume = {47},
pages = {268--298}
}
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Abstract
Abstract: Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His model, however, does not fare well when applied to situations with an interesting dynamic structure (like many experimental games), because it is developed for normal form games in which information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation is suppressed. In this paper we develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit. We propose a new solution concept— sequential reciprocity equilibrium—which is applicable to extensive games, and we prove a general equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, including some well known experimental games like the Ultimatum game and the Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Keyphrases
sequential reciprocity sequential structure strategic situation extensive game normal form game ultimatum game interesting dynamic structure general equilibrium existence result many experimental game experimental game many experimental study sequential prisoner dilemma several example game theory
