Using probabilistic I/O automata to analyze an oblivious transfer protocol

DMCA

Using probabilistic I/O automata to analyze an oblivious transfer protocol (2005)

Cached

Download Links

by Ran Canetti , Ling Cheung , Dilsun Kaynar , Moses Liskov , Nancy Lynch , Olivier Pereira , Roberto Segala

Citations:

8 - 4 self

BibTeX

@TECHREPORT{Canetti05usingprobabilistic,
    author = {Ran Canetti and Ling Cheung and Dilsun Kaynar and Moses Liskov and Nancy Lynch and Olivier Pereira and Roberto Segala},
    title = {Using probabilistic I/O automata to analyze an oblivious transfer protocol},
    institution = {},
    year = {2005}
}

OpenURL

Abstract

We demonstrate how to carry out cryptographic security analysis of distributed protocols within the Probabilistic I/O Automata framework of Lynch, Segala, and Vaandrager. This framework provides tools for arguing rigorously about the concurrency and scheduling aspects of protocols, and about protocols presented at different levels of abstraction. Consequently, it can help in making cryptographic analysis more precise and less susceptible to errors. We concentrate on a relatively simple two-party Oblivious Transfer protocol, in the presence of a semi-honest adversary (essentially, an eavesdropper). For the underlying cryptographic notion of security, we use a version of Canetti’s Universally Composable security. In spite of the relative simplicity of the example, the exercise is quite nontrivial. It requires taking many fundamental issues into account, including nondeterministic behavior, scheduling, resource-bounded computation, and

Keyphrases

oblivious transfer protocol relative simplicity cryptographic analysis simple two-party oblivious transfer protocol automaton framework nondeterministic behavior distributed protocol different level many fundamental issue universally composable security resource-bounded computation cryptographic security analysis underlying cryptographic notion semi-honest adversary

DMCA